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Introduction: The General Threat of Products Liability
Products liability and tort law in general now flnds itself in the limelight both in
the U.S. and in Europe. But the U.S. debates have been especially fierce. For years
now, consumer organizations and trial lawyers on the one side, and those aligned
with. manufacturers on the other side, have opposed each other. As a recent publi-
cation from Mark C. Rahdert puts k:
"The debate over tort reform and the insurance crisis has been a largely
partisan afFair. Advocates on both sides have painted their positions with
extremely broad brushes. All too often, they have been content to rest their
conclusions on sweeping, undocumented, and often unexamined assertions
about the connection between rising insurance costs and the structure of
tort doctrine. State legislatures (the chief engines of tort reform), and to
some extent the courts, have responded in an equally broad-brush, reactive
fashion, with a marked preference for the quick fix over the comprehensive
solution. Inevitably pressed for time and strapped for resources, they have
seldom investigated much below the surface of this complex topic."1
This is also true for products liability. For a very long time now, manufacturers
have tried unsuccesfully to convince the U.S. Congress to pass legislation which
would establish a uniform fedeml Standard for products liability. This is mainly
because the various pressure groups are quite well balanced politically.
Manufacturers have tried for a long time to introduce liability limits or caps, the
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restriction or the abolition of the possibility of punitive damages and the restriction
of strict liability. Otiier interest groups have tried to maintain äs much strict liability
äs possible. In certain instances, they have even advocated a System of pure strict
liability, also known äs causative liability. The result has been that until recently, that
there has been no revolutionary change in the U.S. The case law varies, sometimes
leaning more towards one interest group, and at other times leaning more towards
the other.
In Europe, too, products liability is in the limelight. There is a major difFerence,
though, with the U.S. because even under the recently enacted strict products
liability regulations (the European Communities Directive), there have been very,
very few cases. A recent evaluation report to the European Commission mentions
only three (!) court cases based on the Directive, two in Germany and one in Italy.
And although that number is hard to believe and probably not correct, the difFerence
with the Situation in the U.S. is staggering. One can only guess why so few cases are
brought before the courts. An explanation may be that many cases are settled out of
court. On the other hand, the report states clearly that there was an absence of any
general increase in claims.
In this article we will focus on products liability and aviation. Two American
developments are particularly noteworthy.
Products Liability and Aviation:
Two Recent Developments in the U.S.
A. The General Aviation Revitalization Act
The first one is the enactment, in 1994, of GARA, die General Aviation
Revitalisation Act. The heart of this act is a 18-year Statute of repose to protect
manufacturers from long-term liability.
B. The Restatement (Third)
The second development is the engagement of die American Law Institute in
developing a new Restatement (Third) of Torts2, starting with the law of products
liability.3 One of the major changes in the new Restatement deals with design
defects. Subsection (b) of die new Restatement adopts a reasonableness (i.e., a
risk/utility balancing) test äs the Standard for judging the defectiveness of product
designs. More specifically, according to the Comment, die test is whether a
reasonable alternative design would have, at reasonable cost, reduced the foreseeable
2 Proposcd Final Draft (April l, 1997).
3 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (March 13, 1995), acceptcd in part by the membcrs of the
American Law Institute.
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risks of härm posed by the product and if so, whether the omission of die alternative
design rendered the product not reasonably safe.
There has been a great deal of discussion in the U.S. about GARA and the new
approach that was chosen in the Restatement. Often, that discussion is reduced to a
simple strict liability versus negligence discussion. We question whether this
approach is correct. Comparing the new proposal widi EC law may help. This
article looks at these two recent developments and tries to compare U.S. law with
E.G. law. Is the U.S., widi GARA and die Restatement, really on its way from strict
liability to supernegligence?
The Introduction of GARA in U.S. Products Liability Law
Often products liability is seen äs die cause of die decline in small aircraft
manufacturing. Of die world's small aircraft, approximately seventy-five percent
operate in the U.S. It is said diät 5000 small communities in America use small
aircraft äs dieir access to the domestic scheduled air carrier market. The general
aviation industry is said to contribute more than $40 billion annually to tlie U.S.
economy, and employ more than 540,000 people.4 Critics claim that industries
related to general aviation have lost 100,000 Jobs due to die high number of
products liability suits. Even though one can not be sure whether that number is
correct, experts admit that the rise in products liability insurance premiums is
significant.
So, after years of industry lobbying, die result is the General Aviation
Revitalization Act. GARA altered liability law in the U.S. The purpose of the
legislation is to revitalize the industry of general aviation by establishing
"... a Federal Statute of repose to protect general aviation manufacturers
from long-term liability in those instances where a particular aircraft has
been in Operation for a considerable number of years. A Statute of repose is
a legal recognition that, after an extended period of time, a product has
demonstrated its safety and quality, and that it not reasonable to hold a
manufacturer legally responsible for an accident or injury occurring after
diät much time has elapsed."6
The heart of the Act is the Statute of repose of 18 years. That is, unless an
exception applies, no claim may be brought against a manufacturer if the accident
occurs more than 18 years after the date of delivery of the aircraft or after
replacement of an old component with a new one. GARA only applies to small
aircraft and helicopters used for non-scheduled flights.
4 See Robert F. Hcdrick, "A Closc and Critical Analysis of the New General Aviation Revitalization Act," 62
Journal of Air Law and Commene, (1996); p. 389.
5 See for a comprchcnsivc avticle about the allcgcd American aviation crusi.s, Patrick J. Shca, "Solving America's
General Aviation Crisis: the Advantagcs of Federal Prcmemption over Tort Reform," 80:3, Comell Law Review,
(1995), p. 747.
6 49 U.S.C. § 140 Gong. Rcc. H4998-99 (daily cd. June 27,1994) (statcmcnt of Rcp. Fish).
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It is clear that under GARA, the date of the delivery or the date of the
replacement of an old component will be crucial. In the recent California case
Altseimer v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., a personal injury suit stemmed from a
helicopter crash in which the helicopter was older than 18 years.7 The court mied
that GARA is not applicable unless every component which allegedly causes the
accident is older than 18 years. In Altseimer·, the defendant had to prove not only
that the pinion gear box was older than 18 years, but also that the pinion gear, a
component of the gearbox, was more than 18 years old. The consequence is that, if
any of the components at issue are less than 18 years old, GARA will not
automatically preclude the suit. After the replacement of an old component by a new
one äs the American author Steggerda puts it, the repose clock restarts. Steggerda's
correct conclusion is:
"To the defense, the provision highlights the importance of accurate
business record-keeping. The age of an aircraft and all of its components
parts are now critical factors in aviation cases, and businesses should now
devise Systems for infinite-duration record-keeping. To the extent feasible,
businesses should also begin reconstructing their 'ancient' records, the
importance of which is now undisputed."
There are four explicit situations where the repose period is not applicable and
much can be said about diese exceptions. Unfortunately, in this short article we can
merely refer the reader to other studies.9
GARA äs Compared to European Law
In all EC countries, products liability is governed by the EC Directive on
products liability. In his article "Aviation Products Liability Law in Europe: An
Update," Jean-Michel Fobe presents some Information about aviation. A British
insurance Company stated that there is a tendency of the public to claim damages in
respect of minor losses caused by defective products. Other insurers confirmed that
the Directive had no effect on the premium levels of products liability insurance or
on insurance capacity. Aerospace manufacturers in Germany, France and the United
Kingdom reported no increased claims. One major aerospace manufacturer con-
firmed that, in one case claimants have invoked the transposition of the Directive
but that this did not affect its defense. The Company stated that it could well be that
the new legislation induced more amicable settlements.
According to the Fobe study, many industries have stated that there is now a
change in commcrcial usage since the entry into force of the Directive. Legal
drafting of commercial agreements is very careful to allow a producer or an importer
7 919 F.Supp. 340 (E.D. Cal. 1996).
8 Todd R. Steggerda, "GARA's Achilles: The Problcmatic Application of the Knowing Misreprcsentation
Exception," 24:2 Tmwpartatian Lim Journal, (1997); p. 197.
See e.g. Stcggerda, sufra.
10 Jean-Michel Fobe, "Aviation product liability in Europe: an Update," The Aviation Quarterly (1997); p. 159ff.
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who would be regarded äs liable on first sight, to exercise his right of recourse
against his contractors. The Directive might not be the only reason for these
changes. Other factors are the general improvement in safety Standards and
increased attention to quality and safety. A changed approach toward risk
management is noted äs well.11 The heart of the directive can be found in the very
first article which states that "the producer shall be (stricdy) liable for the damage
caused by a defect in his product." There are, however, six exceptions. For this
article, one exception is of particular importance. Article 7(b) determines that the
manufacturer shall not be liable if he proves
"that, having regard to the circumstances, it is probable that the defect
which caused the damage did not exist at the time when the product was put
into circulation by him or that this defect came into being afterwards."
The bürden of proof lies with the manufacturer. Up until now, we have no case
law that gives any guidance äs to how strict the manufacturers' proof should be. The
article nonetheless makes it clear that, with respect to Older' products, the producer
may escape liability.
Especially helpful for European manufacturers is the Directive's Statute of limita-
tion in article 11:
"Member states shall provide in their legislation that the rights
conferred upon the injured person pursuant to this Directive shall be
extinguished upon the expiry of a period of 10 years from the date on which
the producer put into circulation the actual product which caused the
damage, unless the injured person has in the meantime instituted
proceedings against the producer."
So, 10 years after the defective product has been put into circulation, plaintiffs
can no longer base their claim on strict (products) liability. Of course a plaintiff
can sue under negligence, but then he or she must prove negligence on the side of
the manufacturer. In that case, under Dutch law, an expiration period of 20 years
applies.
Comparing U.S. law and the European Directive, one must admit that the
GARA 18-year of repose is in fact less strict than the European 10-year Statute of
limitations. And in the case of larger planes such äs a Boeing 747, there is no Federal
Statute of limitations. Only state law limitations apply. Besides diät, art. 7(b) of the
EC-Directive can be of great help to the manufacturer. When the Directive was
implemented in the Dutch legislation, one commentator expected that article to
become a very important issue in many cases. Until now, however, that prediction
has not become reality.
For these reasons, the conclusion should be that U.S. products liability in
general, and even GARA, is no more taxing to manufacturers than the European
law is.
11 Fobe,m/>m note 11, at 165.
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The Alternative Design Test of the
New Restatement and Mrs. Brooks
On August 2, 1988, Mr. Brooks died when bis 1968 Beech Musketeer airplane
crashed. His wife brought a wrongful death action against the manufacturer. She
claimed that a defect in the plane's engine caused the plane to crash and that the
absence of shoulder harnesses caused her husband to suffer an enhanced injury
resulting in his death. She filed suit claiming negligence and strict products liability
for alleged design defects.12
U.S. products liability law, äs does EC law, malces die classic distinction
between manufacturing defects, design defects and instances of inadequate warnings
or instructions. Under the proposed new Restatement13, manufacturing defects
would remain subject to strict liability. If the plaintiff can prove that it is probable
that the product failed to comport with reasonable consumer's expectations, because
of a mcmufacturinfj defect, he can invoke strict liability.
Design defects, on the other hand, are more difficult to deal with. Under the
new Restatement, design defects would be governed exclusively by a new, and more
stringent, liability Standard. That part of the proposed new section reads äs follows:
"a product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of härm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption
of a reasonable alternative design ... and the omission of the alternative
design renders the product not reasonably safe."
The bürden of proof lies with the victim. He must prove that a reasonable
alternative design was feasible and that without the alternative design, it was not
reasonable to manufacture and seil the product. That is why some commentators say
that the new design defect test should not be classified äs a mere negligence
Standard. Perhaps 'super' negligence would be a more appropriate label.
It is a fact that the discussions in the ALI on the proposal regarding the
alternative design test have been heated. In American academic writing, some
authors are already speaking of the new proposal äs being a giant step backwards
from strict liability towards 'super negligence.'14
Under prevailing rules concerning allocation of bürden of proof, the plaintiff
must prove diät such a reasonable alternative was, or reasonably could have been,
available at the time of sale or distribution. In the case of the first reasonableness
12 The casc was dccidcd by Suprcmc Court of New Mexico. Brooks v. Beech Aircruft Cm-j)., 120 N.M. 372, 902
P.2d 54 (1995). See Patricia M. Monaghan, "Suprcme Court Permits Design Defect Claims in Both Strict
Liability and Negligence: Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp.," 26 NM.L. Rev., (1996); p. 629.
13 The ALI's Restatements are a unique type of private, advisory codes. Although they are not binding äs
legislation unlcss a court or legislature chooscs to follow them, for decades the Restatements have provcn to bc
extremely authoritativc pronouncemcnts of the law. Perhaps the most famous has been the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which has been of enormous influcnce on American tort law for 30 ycars.
14 See for example Elizabcth C. Price, supm, 1995, and Philip H. Corboy (a famous plaintiff lawycr), The Not-
So-Quict Revolution: Rcbuilding Barriers to Jury Trial in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability, 61:4 Tenn. L Ref., (1995); p. 1043.
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test, imagine what the most accident-proof and safe car would be like. As most
people would call this hypothetical vehicle a tank, and not a car, it would not be
considered to be a reasonable alternative.15 For Mrs. Brooks this proposal would
mean that she would have to prove that a shoulder harness would have been a
feasible alternative and that without the alternative design, it was not reasonable to
manufacture and seil the plane.
In Brooks, the law of New Mexico was applicable, and New Mexico is one U.S.
state which has not required a design defect to be determined by comparison with a
prototype. That state's fbrmula has used a broader unreasonable risk of injur/ test,
which allows proof and legal argument under any rational dieory of defect.'16 Fur-
ther, New Mexico law allows evidence of the risk of a product available at die time
of trial and does not limit application of die risk Utility calculation to the technology
available at the time- of design or distribution of the product.17 Thus,. "[t]he
distinction between the negligence approach proposed by the Restatement (Third)
l S
and strict liability is die time frame in which the risk-benefit calculation is made."
The New Mexico Supreme Court expressly chose not to follow die proposed
Restatement (Third) Standard for design defects. The Court noted that in most
actual cases, including the one before it involving a small Beech aircraft with no
shoulder harnesses, the manufacturer is actually aware of the risks of die selected
design and the dien available alternatives. As for tliose rare instances where tlie
technology loiown at trial and what was knowable at die time of design and
distribution of the product differed (a distinction dismissed äs 'academic' and
virtually non-existent in the real world), the New Mexico Court held that it was
fairer for the manufacturer and suppliers to bear die loss. The Court did hold out die
promise that if such a case actually arose, it would reconsider the application of the
state of die art defense.19
For Mrs. Brooks, it would not have made much difference if the proposed
Restatement (Third) Standard or the New Mexico's test applied because die
testimony showed diät Beech Aircraft had developed a shoulder harness prior to die
design and manufacture of die plane which was the subject of the suit. Another
plaintiff might not be äs fortunate because she might not be able to procure so easily
the evidence required under die proposed Standard and thcrefore would be unable to
have her case decided by a Jury.
15 E.g.,Drüsonstok v. Volkswagen-Werk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974) (considcring whcthcr a Volkswagen
van is "dcfcctivc" because it was not designcd with a long hood containing the motor of the van). The case and
issue are discusscd by Richard L. Cupp, Defining the Boundarics of "Alternative Design" Under the Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts: The Nature and Role of Substitute Products in Design Defect Analysis, 63:2 Tmn. L.
Rev., (1996); p. 329.
16 Brooks v. Beech Aircmft Corp., 902 P.2d, at 61.
17 Id. at 62.
18 Ibid.
i9Ibi4.
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A Giant Step Backwards?
If the alternative design test is accepted by the American courts, will that be a
giant step backwards in the law of products liability?21 First, consider some of the
nuances that the Restatement itself ofFers.
Some academic comments on the new Restatement argue that every producer
will proclaim that its product design was the safest in use at the time of sale and that
a proposed alternative design was not adopted by any manufacturer, or even
considered for commercial use, at the time of sale. Nevertheless, if a plaintiff
introduces expert testimony to establish that a reasonable alternative design could
practically have been adopted, a trier of fact may conclude that the design of the
product was defective.
While the plaintiff must prove that a reasonable alternative design would have
reduced the foreseeable risks of härm, par. 2(b) does not require the plaintiff to
actually produce a prototype in order to malte out a prima facie case. For example,
qualified expert testimony on the issue would suffice if it reasonably supports the
conclusion that a reasonable alternative design could have been adopted at the time
of sale. Nor is the plaintiff required to establish in detail the costs and benefits
associated with adoption of the suggested alternative design.23 In fact, the
Restatement Comment argues, given the relative limitations on the plaintiffs access
to relevant data, the plaintiff is not required to establish in detail the costs and
benefits associated with adoption of the suggested alternative design.24
The traditional consumer expectations test is not abandoned by the new
Restatement. It remains an important factor for juries to consider.
The Comment on section 2(b) also allows consideration of a broad ränge of
factors in determining whether an alternative design is reasonable and whether its
omission renders a product not reasonably safe. The factors include the magnitude
of the foreseeable risks of härm, the accompanying instructions and warnings, the
nature and strength of consumer expectations regarding the product, the relative
advantages and disadvantages of the product äs designed and äs it alternatively could
have been designed, and the effects of the alternative design on production costs,
product longevity, maintenance and repair, esthetics and marketability.26
It is important to note that it is not a relevant factor that the imposition of
liability would have a negative effect on corporate earnings or would reduce employ-
ment in a given industry. If an alternative design was available, and it is so that
21 See about that question further C.J.J.M. Stoiker & D.I. Levine, 'The Reasonable Alternative Design Test:
Back to Negligence?," 5:2 Consumer Law Journal, [1997]; p. 41.
21 Id. Comment at 18.
23 Id. Comment at 25.
24 Ibid.
KIbid.
26 U. Comment at 24.
27 Ibid.
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"the omission of that alternative renders the product not reasonably safe", a broad
ränge of factors legitimately may be considered in determining whether an
alternative design is reasonable. All, or some, of these factors may determine
whether or not the product is defectively designed. The Comment adds, however,
that the plaintifT is not necessarily required to introduce proof on all of these
factors.28 They will vary from case to case.
Now that the new Restatement has been adopted, will the American Law
Institute be leading American courts to talce the law a giant step backwards? Would
U.S. law, in practice, really Start to differ greatiy from Europe's, with its consumer
expectations test? Apart from the nuances the Restatement itself ofFers we wonder
for various reasons.
a) the alternative design test of the new Restatement would apply only to
design defects not to manufacturing defects;
b) even if he does not have to produce an alternative prototype, the bürden
of proof on consumer expectations in Europe - äs a principle - still rests
with the plaintiff;
c) even under the proposed new Restatement, manufacturers may be liable
for härm caused by manifestly dangerous products without proof of a
reasonable alternative design;
d) in the U.S. the risk/utility balance will still play a role;
e) in almost all of the European countries, the manufacturer may invoke
the development risk defense;
f) in case of design defects, it will often come down to a Statement of an
external expert or on the simple comparison to a safer product that is
already sold in the market.
Finally, and this seems to be forgotten by the opponents of the new
Restatement, the law regarding products liability actually is not strict liability per se,
although it does sound strict. That is particularly true for the category of design
defects. In fact, European products liability law is only really strict in so far äs
manufacturing defects are concerned. Also, the liability of other suppliers under the
Directive (art. 3) is a form of vicarious (strict) liability. That conclusion is also
reached by the Oxford scholar Jane Stapleton:
"Analysis of the core idea of'defect' in the EG product rule shows, first,
that contrary to the common description of those rules äs imposing 'strict
liability3 on manufacturers of products, the 'defect' notion in combination
with Article 6(2) and the defense in Article 7(e) of the Directive generates a
28 ibid.
29 At least one important U.S. commentator contends that U.S. law is the samc: "the conccpt of'strict liability'
applies properly only to manufacturing flaw cases, and ... ncgligence principlcs and ncgligencc doctrine govern
liability in design and warnings cases." David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restatcd: Exploding the "Strict"
Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. Illinois L. Rev. 743, 786 (1996). Professor Owcn believes that the proprosed
Restatement (Third) should proclaim this distinction "fortjirightly."
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liability on manufacturers rarely, if ever, greater than the liability in
negligence and one that is often narrower."30
What Matters is the Bürden of Proof
Nevertheless, what really matters, both in Europe and the U.S., is how the judge
will (and should) handle the bürden of proof. This is the reason why the Dutch
Government, with its flexible division of the bürden of proof taken from the Dutch
Code of Civil Procedure, tried for so long to keep the somewhat unsubtle rule on
the bürden of proof from the European Directive out of the Dutch Civil Code. This
has finally, under pressure of the manufacturers' lobby, failed. Still, one works from
the presumption that the reasonableness of the Situation can bring the judge to
change the bürden of proof.
And is it not already true that in The Netherlands and in the U.S., in cases of
design defects, an expert will need to be called in for help? It is our opinion that, äs a
practical matter, in many of the American design cases it does not really matter that
much which system one chooses: the alternative design test äs gatekeeper with a
consumer expectations test afterwards, or applying a consumer expectations test
directly. The reason is that it may not matter very much which test is utilized if that
the trier of fact's conclusion about the 'expectation of the consumer' will be heavily
influenced by the answer to the question whether an alternative design would have
been feasible. Under either analysis, it will almost always be important to determine
whether an alternative design was available and whether the consumer was entitled
to expect that alternative.
Conclusions
Two recent U.S. new developments are considered in the field of products
liability and aviation. Both the General Aviation Revitalization Act and the
alternative design test were compared with EC products liability law.
The difference between U.S. and E.G. law is not that large in either context. The
introduction of GAEA is, compared to EC law, not an irresponsible step away from
strict liability towards negligence. With respect to the alternative design test, we
conclude diät both regimes - the Third Restatement and the Directive - do not
differ that much from one another with respect to design defects. Almost always it
comes down to whether an alternative design is possible and whether this is also a
rensonable alternative and what the consumer could reasonably expect.
Where design defects are concerned, negligence is consequently very important
and may well become even more important in the future in U.S. law. However,
products liability never has been exclusively a regime of strict liability. It seems that
' JANE STAPLETON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, Buttcrworths, (1994); p 271/2.
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American tort law may be about to engage in an experiment where the mix will
include a litüe more negligence and a little less strict liability.
31 Therc is, however, one aspect that wc want to undcrlinc: thc liability towards innoccnt victims on thc ground
who got injurcd äs a rcsult of air trafic accidcnts. It is our opinion that thc liability towards thcse victims should
bc äs 'strict' äs possiblc. And, äs rcgards thc qucstion of who should bc hcld liablc, wc would prcfcr to choosc
not for thc manufacturer of the aircraft, but for thc owncr or thc opcrator. See further Carcl J.J.M. Stoiker and
David I. Lcvinc, "Compensation for Damagc to Parties on thc Ground äs a Rcsult of Aviation Accidcnts," 22:2
Air & Space Law, (1997); p. 60. See also, quitc imprcssive, D.H. Kim, 'The International Aviation Law:
Regulation of Air Traffic in Thc Law of International Rclations," Editcd by thc Local Public Entity Study
Organization Chuogakuin University, Japan, 1997, cspccially pp. 390ff.
